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REEVALUATING SELF-DETERMINATION IN
A POST-COLONIAL WORLD
Joshua Dilk*

The demise of colonialism has given rise to the acceptance of a
system of international human rights law. However, the painful and drawn
out genesis of this system has left it littered with the detritus of the past.
While the nexus of State and UN action is constantly being defined, this
process, rather than expanding the rights of those under the UN's mandate,
reveals the stagnation and attendant paternalism that characterized the old
imperial order.' Decolonization spread Western legal norms to the former
colonies, but entrenched in historical prejudices held by the colonizers. 2
One of those norms: the concept of self-determination, which was
enshrined anid elaborated in the UN Charter, the ICCPR, and the ICESRC,
was viewed as a tool to emancipate the Developing World. 3 But the tool
turned in the hands of its users. Application of self-determination has, subsequent to de-colonization, served the leaders of the international order and
failed to break the cycle of warfare and degradation that plagues the decolonized world. Gone is Woodrow Wilson's concept of Self-Determination as a means to protect ethnic or minority "peoples."4 In its place, international efficacy led the colonial powers to transpose "colonial rule" with
self-determination cloaked in the rhetoric of human rights. 5
* Hamilton College, B.A.; University of Oxford, M.St.; University at Buffalo
Law School, J.D. The author would like to thank his parents and Dean Makau
Mutua for their unwavering support.
I JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION 34
(2000).
2

Id. at 23.

3 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 available at http://www.un.orgfen/documents/
charter/chapterl.shtml; See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), at 49, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICESCRI.
4 Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Point Address, reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF
WOODROw WILSON at 155-62 (Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd eds.,
1927).
5 CASTELLINO, supra note 1, at 23; See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), at 66, U.N.
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In the 1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial
countries and peoples, the UN stated that one of its goals was ending
colonialism and that "all peoples have the right to self-determination. . . [to]
freely determine their political status and. . .pursue their economic [and]
social. . .development." 6 In the same declaration the UN then simultaneously denied these freedoms to minority groups within the former colonies
by reaffirming the UN's commitment to territorial integrity. 7 This precept,
scholastically labeled uti possidetis, robbed the former colonial world of
their right to truly exercise state-building in anything but a pre-ordained
Western conception of the idea. The result is disaster across Africa in the
form of corrupt authoritarian regimes, genocide, starvation, and the continuance of the same basic failures of human existence that characterized the
colonial era.
Part of the blame for the continued political instability rests in the
UN's haphazard application of the right of self-determination and its attendant corollary, uti possidetis. This paper addresses this inconsistency and
contrasts it with different applications of it outside Africa. In Zimbabwe,
Nigeria, and the Sudan, the UN's stance led to civil war, while in Eritrea it
eventually led to full independence in violation of uti possidetis. Rather
than suppressing the paternalistic and imperialist attitudes of the past, UN
practice seems determined to maintain it.
Self-determination needs to be reappraised in a fully post-colonial
world. Rather than understand the right in terms of former colonial territory, now that colonialism has ended, self-determination needs to be reexamined in terms of ethnic minorities as originally voiced by Woodrow
Wilson at the Versailles Conference. 8 While every ethnic group should not
be able to carve out a microstate for themselves, a right for ethnic minorities to possess alternative state options ranging from regional autonomy,
federation, and only in limited situations, the ability to secede and create a
new country should be systematically recognized.
Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali was adamant
that the UN had not closed the door to future statehood but noted that "if
every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be
no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for
G.A.O.R., 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) [hereinafter
the 1960 Declaration].
6
The 1960 Declaration, supra note 5, at 67.
Id., (declaring that "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
7
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.")
8
See Wilson, supra note 4, at 159-62.
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all would become ever more difficult to achieve." 9 While this statement is
facially true, it masks the underlying question of whether existing states
could reinvent themselves such that their rebirth could signal a better day
for their citizens. Unless a reexamination of self-determination occurs, this
seems unlikely and will continue to force peoples and nations in trouble to
choose the certainty of post-self-determination confusion and conflict over
the other equally unpalatable option of doing nothing at all.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT

SELF-DETERMINATION:

Although morphed into a concept inseparable from the Developing
World, Self-Determination's origins lie in the Western European Liberal
tradition. 10 Anti-Monarchists and those considering new models of political
government saw the necessity of governance by the consent of the governed
as vital to any enlightened society.' The American Declaration of Independence captured this idea in its Preamble:
whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its founda-

tion on such principles and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety
and happiness.12 [emphasis added]
Self-Determination was a means to secure a government that was
legitimate in the eyes of its people because it derived from them. One author has posited that that this 'democratic entitlement' has historically underlied self-determination and, as will be seen, continues to do so to the
present day.' 3 The French Revolution in 1789 adopted the American ideology and asserted that international legitimacy derives from domestic acceptance of the current government.14 Both of these events predicated selfdetermination on the existence and implicit acceptance of the State's sover9 The Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, andpeace-keeping, 17, deliveredto the Security Council and the General

Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/241 11 (June 17, 1992).
10

MAKUA MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS:

A

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE

44-47

(2002); see CASTELLINO supra note 1, at 10-13.

" See Thomas M. Franck, Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
JUR. INT'L LAW 46, 46 (1992).
12 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

13

Franck supra note

14

ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES:

I1, at 46.

11-14 (Cambridge Univ. Press)(1995).

A

LEGAL REAPPRAISAL
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eignty. Self-Determination, for them, could not exist without a clearly defined territory, people, government, and the capacity to deal with other
states.' 5 Twentieth century politicians and theorists reinterpreted this idea
after the Second World War making it into a more malleable form that
remains in force today.
After World War I, self-determination became a means for protecting ethnic minorities and strengthening nationalism in the hopes of preventing another conflict. Wilson, the American President, advocated providing
oppressed peoples 'the right of democracy."' 6 This euphemism for selfdetermination had four components: 1) the right of people to determine
their government; 2) the restructuring of European states (particularly Austria-Hungary) according to nationalist desires; 3) a method of changing the
territorial boundaries of the corresponding nation to benefit the inhabitants
of a specific location by; and 4) a settling of conflicting colonial territorial
claims. 17
Although some of these components did nothing but support the
status quo (particularly component 4) in that the victorious powers used
self-determination as a means to advance their colonial enterprise at the
expense of the vanquished, Wilson's conception of self-determination was
forward-looking in that it sought to address those groups of people who
were ignored on the international scene. Unfortunately, the problems that
plagued Wilson's interpretation of self-determination: definitional ambiguity, legislative obstinacy, haphazard application and geo-politics, continue
to do so today.' 8 In addressing post-World War II problems with the application of self-determination, one addresses problems analogous to those extant in Wilson's time.
A panoply of international treaties, charters, and declarations spanning five decades elaborate the UN's position on self-determination.1 9 This
ANTHONY AusT, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (Cambridge Univ.
Press)(2005)(noting that these are standard characteristics a territory must possess
in order to be considered a State, along with some form of international recognition). See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
(Clarendon Press)(1979)(providing a more thorough analysis of recognition).
16 See Wilson, supra note 4 .
17 CASSESE, supra note 14, at 20-21.
18 Id. at 22-23.
19 U.N. Charter, supra note 3; 1960 Declaration, supra note 5; ICCPR, supra note
3; ICESCR, supra note 3; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
1883d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter the
15

2010

POST-COLONIAL SELF-DETERMINATION

293

drawn out elucidation of the concept creates confusion as to its interpretation, especially when considered in light of the global history of the past
half-century. One of the purposes of the UN, according to its Charter, is to
develop "friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . ."20 While this
founding purpose seems noble, it is not defined. In fact, the only other
mention of this principle, also lacking in explication, is in Article 55 where
there is an oblique reference to self-determination as the ambit within which
the UN should promote economic, social, and cultural growth. 2 1
It is clear, when examining the other articles, that language dealing
with self-determination was a sop for the US and UK when it was incorporated. They are vague statements devoid of any implementing language or
guidelines from which to work. 22 When compared to Article 2, which imposes negative restraints on State and UN action, or in Chapter V, which
defines the role and scope of the Security Council, the Charter uses explicit
terms and describes specific mechanisms for its operation. 23 Without more,
the UN lacked any clear mandate to speak to the right of self-determination.
It needed a definitional evolution; such change came, not from the West,
but from the Developing World and the USSR.
The subsequent 1960 Declaration was an attempt by non-Western
countries to end colonialism and spark a socialist revolution. 24 It was also
an honest effort to define what the UN Charter left undefined. 2 5 Although
part of the UN's purpose was to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights," the UN felt that reifying this credo was necessary to take aim at a
1970 Declaration]; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter the Declaration on Minorities];
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at art 21-22, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948)[hereinafter
UDHR].
20 U.N. Charter, supra note 3, at art. 1, 12.
21
Id. at art. 55.
22 See id. at arts. 1, 55; see CASSESE, supra note 14, at 48-52.
23 See, U.N. Charter, supra note 3 art. 2, 14, 7, Chapter V, arts. 23-32; Sikander
Shah, An In-Depth Analysis of the Evolution of Self-Determination Under International Law and the Ensuing Impact on the Kashmiri Freedom Struggle, Past and
Present, 34 N. Ky. L. REV. 29, 32 (2007).

See
(1982).
24

25

MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE,

Id. at 11.

12-13
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widely practiced breach of those rights. 2 6 The 1960 declaration instead relied upon Article 1 of the UN Charter and stated "that the subjugation of
peoples to alien subjugation and domination constitutes a violation of fundamental human rights. . .and that all people had a right of self-determination." 27 While the 1960 Declaration provided greater specificity as to
whom the right of self-determination applied, it did so within a Statist rubric that ignored the variety of ethnic and cultural minorities within the
Colonial State.
The 1960 Declaration provided positive obligations on Imperial
states to protect their colonial populations and to take measures to emancipate them. 28 By doing so, the drafters restricted self-determination to the
victims of "alien subjugation, domination, or exploitation," or, in other
words, those colonized by European powers. 29 The effect, however, was
that while colonial populations had the right of self-determination, they
were considered as one homogenous group; minorities within this group
were ignored. 30 The 1960 Declaration, rather than expanding the definition
of those possessing the right of self-determination, restricted it to a narrowly defined class, albeit one that is paradoxically hard to define.
This served the interests of the major powers in that de-colonization
could proceed without paralytic complexity. For example, and as will be
elaborated on later, restricting the number of groups who could invoke selfdetermination made it possible for Nigeria to gain independence as a unified, singular entity and not a balkanized former colony with over 1,000
ethnic sub-states. In this way, colonial powers could more easily undertake
de-colonization efforts without having to get lost in the complexities of African socio-political reality. Importantly, this document also limited the
scope of self-determination that colonized peoples could take. Article 6 of

U.N. Charter, supra note 3, pmbl.
The 1960 Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 2.
28 Id. arts. 4, 5, 7.
29 See The 1960 Declaration, supra note 5 arts. 1, 2(Article 2 is dependent on
Article I in that 'people's', as defined in Article 1,informs Article 2 as to who that
term describes); Shah, supra note 23, at 33.
30 See U.N. EcoN. & Soc. COUNCIL, SUB-COMM'N ON PREVENTION OF DiSCRIMI-

26

27

NATION

&

PROT. OF MINORITIES, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMEN-

TATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

(1980) (preparedby H6ctor Gros Espiell).

1 60, 979 U.N. Sales No. E.79.XIV.5
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the 1960 Declaration reinforces uti possidetis; a continuing trend that will
be discussed later in the paper.3 1
The ICCPR and ICESCR entered into force in 1976 and, although
couching their language in universalities, continued to conflate territoriality
with an identifiable 'people' and to ignore minority groups within the
state. 32 Common Article 1 of both treaties states that "[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development." 33 Yet despite the aspirational tone of the language (i.e., 'all
peoples'), the third paragraph of these treaties delimits just what 'all peoples' means: those people living in Non-Self-Governing or Trust Territories. 34 But this answer generates a further question: within the context of a
Non-Self-Governing or Trust Territory, what does 'all peoples' refer to?
The answer to this question reveals the definitional ambiguity inherent in this problem. Both the UN Charter and the Covenants outline
their purposes in aspirational universal language in Article 1.35 They then
constrain their meaning by applying this universal principle only to colonial
territories. At the surface, 'all peoples' refers to colonized people. Article
27 of the ICCPR, the mechanism that restricts the earlier aspirational language, states that
[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.3 6 [emphasis added]
This contradiction in the ICCPR confirms one thing: 'Peoples,' as
described in Article 1, have their right of self-determination protected,
The 1960 Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 6 (preventing those exercising their
right of self-determination in the face of colonial occupation from breaking up the
territorial integrity of the pre-existing colony).
31

See

supra note 1, at 73.
33 ICCPR & ICESCR, supra note 3, at art. 1, 1.
34 Id. at art. 1, 13; Shah, supra note 23, at 35.
35 See U.N. Charter, supra note 3, at art. 1, 12 ("[F]riendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples. . ."); ICCPR & ICESCR, supra note 3, at art. 1, 1 ("[A]ll peoples have
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.")
36 ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 27.
32

CASTELLINO,
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while 'minorities' have their individual right to practice their culture protected, but cannot self-determine their future.37 India, for example, took
this position in its reservation to the language of Article 1. They stated that
self-determination applies only to 'peoples under foreign domination' and
that self-determination does not apply to "a section of a people or nation-which is the essence of national integrity." 38
The Human Rights Committee has reinforced this position as well.
In the Mikmaq Case, the Committee ruled that the advocate for the Mikmaq
peoples in Canada could not bring an Article 1 claim for lack of standing. 39
The Committee also ruled that since self-determination was a collective
right, the claims brought by the advocate failed in that they were unable to
specify a violation that affected individuals within the tribe. 40 The Mikmaq
were not a 'people' as understood within Article 1 and thus had no standing
to bring claims alleging a deprivation of their right to self-determination.
The Committee implies that were the Mikmaq to bring their claim under
Article 27, which protects the rights of minorities, it would have had more
weight but still would not have created a right to self-determination. 4 1 Article 1, then, while seemingly far-reaching in its effect, is limited by Article
27.42
CASSESE, supra note 14, at 61; POMERANCE, supra note 24, at 18 (quoting
Rosalyn Higgins' position that "Self-determination refers to the right of the majority within a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power.").

37

38

UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS,

UN Doc. ST/HR/5, 1987, 9 (noting that India held this position due to its precarious position due to its having recently become independent with a large collection
of powerful ethnic groups. Fears over Kashmiri self-determination also factored
heavily in its mind.)
39 Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/39/40), 200
((Sept. 30, 1980) (asserting that the tribal leader was not representative of a people
and could not show that the Mikmaq people had suffered violations under various

human rights treaties.
40
41

Id.
See, Id.

supra note 14, at 62 (stating that minorities are often difficult to
define. For many, these groups possess: 1) numericial inferiority to another defined majority; 2) are a defined group of people with a discernibly different culture;
3) exist within a state; 4) are in a non-dominant position in that state; 5) exists in
the face of a majority that is attempting to preserve its culture in the face of the
minority's; and, 6) possesses a culture at risk of destruction in the face of the majority); CASTELLINO, supra note 1, at 57-59 (discussing how the difference be42

CASSESSE,

tween majorities and minorities is thus extremely subtle and boils down to which
group has state-sponsored authority); see Declaration on the Rights of Persons Be-
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This presents a problem that one author aptly summarized when he
stated that self-determination is described as the right of peoples, not minorities, but that:
...

[S]elf-determination and minority rights are locked in a

relationship which is part of the architecture of the nation
State, since whenever a State is forged, the result is the creation of minorities . .3
The question of what separates peoples and minorities is a fundamental question when examining self-determination. Without a clear definition, it is impossible to consistently apply this right. Sadly, we are still
searching for said definition. A 1977 study by the UN Special Rapportuer,
Francesco Caportorti, defined minorities as:
A group which is numericially inferior to the rest of the
population of a State and in a non-dominant position,
whose members possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity,
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion and language."
This description is useful when minority groups are dramatically
smaller than their counterparts in a country. 45 However, in ethnically diverse countries such as Nigeria, this description would apply to nearly any
ethnic group in the coalition government. 46 Of the 55 million people living
in Nigeria at independence, roughly half of that number belonged to the
three ruling ethnic groups in Nigeria: the Hausa-Fulani, the Ibo, and the
Yoruba. The other half of the country's population was composed of over
1000 ethnic groups of varying size and complexity spread throughout the
longing to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. res. 47/135,
annex, art. 1-3, at 210, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/47/49
(December 18, 1992).
43

PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES,

13 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).

1

FRANCESCO CAPTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING To ETH-

UN Sales No. E.91.xiv.2 (1977).
See, for example, Mikmaq Tribal Society, supra note 39;
46 See Pius L. Okoronkwo, Self-Determination and the Legality ofBiafra's Secession Under InternationalLaw, 25 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COmP. L. REV. 63, 65 (2002);
M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-DeterminationBeyond the Colonial Context: Biafra
in Retrospect, 10 TEx INT'L L. J. 321, 325-27 (1975).
NIc, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES,

45
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country. This decentralization quickly leads to confusion and, in Nigeria's
case, civil war. Apart from demarcating the divide between the two labels,
Captorti's description implies that self-determination exists only for the
'people' that are in charge of the country. Understood this way, defining a
'minority' as other than the 'people' in charge preserves the status of the
'people' at the continuing expense of the 'minority'.
The major UN conventions and treaties dealing with human rights
have introduced concepts and practices that are at odds with one another.
'Peoples' possess the right to self-determination while 'minorities', an
amorphous term, do not. Another factor that leads to confused application
of this right is the modern corollary to self-determination: uti possidetis
juris. In its modern conception, uti possidetisjurisensures "that new States
will come to independence with the same boundaries that they had when
they were administrative units within the territory or territories of a colonial
power." 47 In other words, utipossidetisjurisis similar to language found in
a building code prohibiting any renovation that might change the historic
character of a building despite the need for modem adjustments. If the restriction of self-determination to politically defined colonized peoples laid
the foundation for the inconsistency as to its application, this doctrine
serves as its mortar.
Although the preambles and initial articles of the major human
rights documents proscribe an expansive recognition of peoples' rights to
self-determine, the 1960 and 1970 Declarations, meant to inform the
ICCPR and ICESCR in its application of Self-Determination, dampen one's
hope for the realization of such rights. Article 6 of the 1960 Declaration,
and the Preamble and Declaration of the 1970 Declaration, affirms the UN's
commitment to holding a State's territory inviolable as a breach of the UN's
founding principles. 48 The ICJ, as late as 1986, stated that,
[Uti possidetis] is a general principle, which is logically
connected with the phenomenon of obtaining independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent
the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the changing of
frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering

power. 4 9
Malcom N. Shaw, The Heritageof States: The Principleof Uti PossidetisJuris
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L., 75, 97 (1996).
48 1960 Declaration, supra note 5, art. 6; 1970 Declaration, supra note 19, preamble, declaration.
49 The Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 544 (Dec. 22).
47

Today, 67
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Thus, the Court states that the principle exists to protect the integrity of newly independent states, to stop border wars, and to provide stability for able governance.50 Ironically, the Court is not entirely wrong. Uti
possidetis did help to address these problems. The border wars that characterized the newly independent African states in the 1960s, as well as the
Katanga secession crisis at the start of the decade, threatened the stability of
the nascent African States.5 ' These border disputes variously involved
Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Congo, and many other states. The Organization
of African Unity, drawing on the 1960 Declaration, drafted the 1964 Cairo
Declaration in which all African states "pledge[d] themselves to respect the
borders existing on their achievement of national independence." 52 The
border disputes continued to simmer, but took a legal affect that helped
resolve them.53
THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION:
AFRICA AS COMPARED TO POST-SOVIET EUROPE
In light of the immediate post-colonial independence movements

among ethnic groups, the historical interpretation of self-determination
seems logical. It provided a definitive point from which to crystallize national boundaries in order to create a cohesive national identity. 54 But the

independence movements of post-colonial Africa were far from the relatively orderly movements in the Orange and Velvet Revolutions in Eastern
Europe. In a situation where the Post-colonial states inherited multi-ethnic
populations and a tendency toward autocracy, the doctrine, coupled with the
confused application of self-determination created a Catch-22 in which Africa still languishes.55
50 See CASTELLINO, supra note 1, at 126; Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better
Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 597
(1996).
51 Kathryn Sturman, New Norms, Old Boundaries: The African Union'sApproach
to Secession and State Sovereignty, in ON THE WAY TO STATEHOOD: SECESSION
AND GLOBALISATION, 67, 73 (Aleksander Pavkovic & Peter Radan, eds., 2008).
52

Organization of African Unity [OAU], Border Disputes Among African States,

AHG/Res 16(I) (July 17-21 1964).
See, e.g., Libya v. Chad, 1994 I.C.J. (Feb. 3); Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, 83
ILR.
54 CASTELLINO, supra note 1, at 126.
51 See Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal
Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1144 (1994). For information on a selection of
53

post-Colonial African despotism, see generally, TONY AvIRGAN & MARTHA
HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA: THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN (Lawrence Hill & Company,
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This Catch-22, familiar to those sympathetic to Yossarian's plight,
is that although the UN and the African Union support self-determination in
order to bring freedom to oppressed peoples, and use uti possidetis to facilitate the process, when the post-colonial government began oppressing its
citizens, they deny the oppressed the same right. In other words, one can
utilize self-determination to escape oppressive colonial regimes but must
live with subsequent, homespun, oppression. Unfamiliar with the concepts
of a national identity, the populations of many African states regarded tribal
and family loyalties as paramount. 5 6 Leaders initially elected from within a
specific ethnic group, soon returned to those loyalties to the detriment of
everyone else. Attempts at federation, as in Nigeria, proved a failure. Nigeria provides an example of the problems rigid application of these interrelated concepts engenders.
Nigeria gained its independence on October 1, 1960. It was a former British colony and, at independence, it was set up as a tri-federated
State in which the three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo, each ran a federated province; they were the dominant
ethnic group in their respective province with some corresponding overlap
among them.57 Following a series of coups and ethnic cleansing, the Ibo,
situated in the east, declared their independence from Nigeria on May 30,
1967 and formed the Republic of Biafra.58
The proclamation itself implicitly relied on self-determination as
the core precept of their secession. The Declaration states that the Ibo were
unwilling to serve as "unfree" partners of a corrupt Federation, had the inherent rights to determine their own society, and had to self-determine their
political future through secession in order to secure the freedoms that all
people possess. 59 This immediately led Nigeria to begin a military invasion
of the former province in order to reunify Nigeria.
The eventual reunification of Nigeria demonstrated the absurd results that sprang from a rigid interpretation of self-determination and uti
possidetis. The UN and the OAU condemned the act. The UN went as far
as to state that the civil war was not an international issue and was instead
MICHAEL CLOUGH, FREE AT LAST? U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA AND
THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1992); JAMA MOHAMED GHAULIB, THE SOMALI
CHALLENGE: FROM CATASTROPHE TO RENEWAL (Ahmed I. Samatar, ed., 1994)..
56 K.A. BUSIA, AFRICA IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY 30-31 (1967).

Inc. 1982);

57 Nayar, supra note 46, at 322.

6' 5 1dItHUR
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59 Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra, May 30, 1967 reprinted in 6 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS
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an African affair. 6 0 The Secretary-General stated further that the UN would
only involve itself if the Federation of Nigeria requested aid and that it
would not provide humanitarian aid to Biafra as it was a non-recognized
state and that this preempted it from acting. 61 Subsequent Biafran reunification came at the loss of millions of lives due to starvation, wartime atrocities, and disease.
The UN and the OAU reaffirmed their commitment to self-determination and uti possidetis during the Biafran conflict. The UN stated that
self-determination is only applicable to the entire population of a State, not
a section of it, and that if it were otherwise applied, there "would be no end
to. . .problems." 62 This statement seems prophetic, if for the wrong reasons.
The OAU, later the AU, throughout the Biafran conflict reiterated the illegality of Biafran secession and called upon Nigeria, and Africa at large, to
reintegrate the breakaway region. The problems persist because of the specific interpretation the UN, the AU, and the global community use.
Nigeria is an excellent example because it is the exemplar of a postcolonial multi-ethnic state. Independence was seen as a means to integrate
cultures that had never before been integrated and which were historically
antagonistic to each other. 63 Obafemi Awolowo, Premier of the Western
Region of Nigeria in 1947 said that: "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere
geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as
there are 'English,' 'Welsh,' or 'French.' The word 'Nigerian' is merely a
distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries
of Nigeria from those who do not."64 When that began to collapse soon
after independence, there was little that the groups could do apart from secession and subsequent civil war. The Ibo got both, and without the protection of adequate international norms, suffered for it. The collapsing society
restricted their basic human rights under Article I of the Charter and the
O.A.U., Resolution Adopted by the Fourth OrdinarySession of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government, AGH/Res.51(IV) (Sept. 11-14, 1967) reprintedin
2 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 398, 398 (1969); U.N. Press Release, Transcript of
60

Press Conference by Secretary-General, U Thant, No. SG/SM/1062, 13, 14 (Jan.
28, 1969).

U.N.

at 40; Notes of a confidential UNHCR meeting with
Mr. Udo Affia, 6/1/NIG [3-1964/3-1970], UNHCR Archives in Nathaniel H.
Goetz, HumanitarianIssues in the Biafra Conflict, note 18 (Pepperdine University
School of Public Policy, Working Paper No. 36, 2001).
62 U.N. Press Release, supra note 60, at 14.
63 Nayar, supra note 46, at 324-26.
64 Nayar, supra note 46, at 324 quoting OBAFEMI AwoLowo, PATH TO NIGERIAN
FREEDOM, 47-48 (1947).
61
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ICCPR. 65 Simultaneously, these and other UN documents prevented them
from securing that which they were guaranteed by international law.
Critics of a reappraisal continue to mirror The FrontierLand case's
import that self-determination must be checked by territoriality restrictions
to prevent border wars and to provide international stability. 6 6 The case
concerned a colonial-era border disagreement between Burkina-Faso and
the Republic of Mali. The International Court of Justice, adjudicating the
dispute, worried that reappraisal of self-determination and territorial boundaries "may give rise to very grave consequences, which may endanger the
life of the State itself."67 The ICJ also noted that self-determination was in
conflict with its corollary, uti possidetis, because the general principle of
self-determination was restricted to former colonial territories whose borders became fixed at independence. 68 This confused the issue by placing
African states in a legal straightjacket that was not applied to emergent
states in other parts of the world specifically the post-Soviet Baltic states.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania existed as sovereign states until their
annexation in 1940.69 Historically, all three regions had been part of the
Holy Roman Empire or had existed as provinces of the Swedish or Russian
Empires. 70 After 1918, all three countries were internationally recognized
and, until their annexation, carried out diplomatic and economic relations
with the rest of the world.7 1 During the collapse of the USSR, they declared
their independence in 1990.72 Since then, they have resumed their position
in the international community.
Although the concept of self-determination was important to their
independence movements, differences between the two regions prevent accurate comparisons between the two and show the impropriety of the African solution in the breech . For one thing, the Baltic countries possessed a
65

U.N. Charter, supra note 3, Preamble, art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1.
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territory in the Russian and Swedish Empires).
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historic identity that continued throughout the occupation.73 Their actions
immediately following independence restored lapsed diplomatic ties, established nationality laws predicated on pre-annexation legislation, and restored pre-1940 national boundaries. 74
Estonia, for example, unlike Nigeria, had a literate, western-styled
political history from which to draw upon. Moreover, the region was, if not
ethnically homogenous, politically in favor of independence. 75 This desire
was able to coalesce around a resurgent state in a way that Nigeria was
never able to do where the various ethnic groups saw despotism as a means
of claiming the spoils of the State. 76
Also important to note is that the self-determination of the Baltic
States was facilitated by their secession from the USSR. They cautiously
refrained from using language of self-determination and instead denoted
their actions as 'independence movements.'7 7 Although condemned in Africa, especially in light of the Biafran conflict, and globally forbidden by
the UN, the UN nevertheless recognized the states despite their provenance.
Interestingly, it did so on the basis that the underlying state had unraveled. 78
This reinterpretation applied only to the states created out of the USSR and
Yugoslavia where the supra-nation had in fact, disintegrated. 79 They refused to apply it to situations in Africa where the state had also unraveled.
This creates a double standard wherein African states, embroiled in
civil war and, in some cases, devoid of a centralized government, are forbidden the leeway to alter their state based on guaranteed international
norms, while states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are able to by international fiat.80 It is true that the Charter for the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as the EC Arbitration Panel overseeing the breakup of
Yugoslavia, reaffirmed the commitment to self-determination limited by uti

7 Id. at 15 (quoting Kristina Marek) ("[t]here can still be a relation of identity and
continuity between the independent Baltic States of 1940 and such Baltic States as

will recover their effective freedom.
74 See id. at 15-7.
7 See CASSESSE, supra note 14, at 261-63.
Mutua, supra note 55, at 1158.
77 See CASSESE, supra note 14, at 260.
71 Mikulas Fabry, Secession and State Recognition in InternationalRelations and
Law, in ON THE WAY TO STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note
52 at 51, 62. .
79 See id. at 61-63; CASTELLINO, supra note 1, at 117-20.
76
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possidetis;81 but the situations to which they had to apply these doctrines
were fundamentally different.

And although it is true that a host of separatist movements within
these newly created countries were denied their right to self-determination,
much as they were in Africa, these countries possessed ethnic demographics
that were much more homogenous than in Africa and, in effect, the creation
of the new states recognized ethnic peoples in a much broader conception
than in post-colonial Africa; they did so by making self-determination contingent on the protection of minorities within the State and by requiring a
democratic form of government. 8 2 World authorities, when dealing with
European countries, allowed a much greater flexibility to the process than
was allowed in Africa with deleterious consequences.
THAWING THE CURRENT NORM: EUROPE As EXAMPLE FOR
AFRICA AND THE ETHIOPIAN SOLUTION

The negative consequences of adhering to a rigid interpretation of
self-determination outweigh the potential benefits to the global community.
A new interpretation is necessary but the sheer weight of international complacency has created inertia that leads many to balk at the prospect. But
change is possible and, unremarked upon by much of the world, has already
taken place in Africa along European lines as pioneered in the Baltic States
and in the former Yugoslavia.
Eritrea, a nascent country on the Red Sea, is unique in that it is the
only nation in the history of both the AU and the UN created from a 'secessionist' movement that successfully succeeded. 83 Historically, there never
existed an independent Eritrean state. It was-under the Kingdoms of
Axum, Kush, and Abyssinia-a series of provinces and minor subsidiary
princedoms that played off of their larger neighbors for support. 84 Between
five and nine major ethnic groups populate the region with different lan-

Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States Preamble, December 21,
1991, 31 I.L.M. 138; See, CASTELLINO, supra note 1, at 118.
82 See Fabry, supra note 78, at 62-64; CASSESE, supra note 14, at 268.
83 Sturman, supra note 51, at 75; CASTELLINO, supra note 1, at 70.
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guages and culture.85 Their mutual antagonism led to their coming under
Ethiopian suzerainty in middle ages and Italian colonial rule in the 1880s. 86
Following the defeat of Italy after World War II, the UN General
Assembly forcibly federated the territory with Ethiopia who, in turn, outright annexed it in 1962.87 This led to thirty years of conflict between Eritrean liberation units, chiefly the EPLF, the TPLF, and the EPRDF, and the
Ethiopian government.88 The Ethiopian Mengistu regime, called 'The
Derg', began to collapse in the early 1990s as Eritrean forces scored major
victories leading to an Ethiopian surrender in 1991.89
After the Derg's defeat, the EPLF set up a Transitional Government
in Ethiopia. They asked for a UN sponsored referendum on Eritrean independence that the Eritrean provisional government echoed. 90 Surprisingly,
the UN acquiesced and, under UN General Assembly Resolution 47/144,
established an Observer Mission to oversee the referendum. 9 ' The resulting
vote, undertaken in 1993, was resoundingly in favor of independence. 9 2
Subsequently, Eritrea was admitted to the AU as well as the UN. 9 3 Events
subsequent to the Ethiopian surrender demonstrate that the international
community can be flexible in its interpretation of self-determination.
This was a stunning move by the global community. Not only had
both organizations allowed Eritrea to secede from Ethiopia, but they also
recognized it, thereby legitimizing the act. They gave what amounted to a
blessing for a multi-ethnic group to break away from a sovereign state.
They had, for this instance, broadened the meaning of the term 'peoples' in
85

Id. at 46-48. The nine major ethnic groups are the Tigre, Tigrigna, Afar, Saho,

Bilen, Kunama, Nara, Hadarib, and the Rashida. The Tigrigna-speaking tribes in
habit the south and east of the country while the Tigre-speaking tribes inhabit the
north and north western parts of the country.
86 See id. at 52-57.
87
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G.A. Res. 390 (V), at 20-22 (Dec. 2, 1950).
For ease of reading, Eritrean liberation units were labeled in the text by their

acronyms. The EPLR refers to the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, the TPLF
refers to the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front, and the EPRDF stands for the Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. See Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 479 531-32 (1994).
89 EYASSU, supra note 84, at 494.
90 Haile, supra note 88, at 531.
91 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 3d Committee, Agenda Item 97(b), Annex II at 4,
U.N. Doe. A/C.3/47/5 (Oct. 29,1992).
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Break with Ethiopia, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1993, at A8).
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terms of self-determination. Rather than being limited to a clearly defined
group sharing linguistic, cultural, and historical commonalities, in this instance it now encompassed a nascent nationalist movement that, according
to the initial UN Commission for Eritrea, was a "mosaic of religious and
linguistic groups" having little in common with each other "but the accident
of their residence." 94
This process seems anomalous in light of the UN and AU's continual refusal to grant recognition to secessionist groups trying to self-determine at the expense of the larger state's territoriality. 95 But, this was no
longer a unilateral endeavor. After Ethiopia's capitulation, its Transitional
Government officially recognized Eritrea as an effort to bring an end to the
warfare. Although Haile Minasse finds fault with this, arguing that the
Transitional Government was a puppet of the EPLRF, this is less troubling
than he believes. 96 Afterall, the EPLRF was partly composed of Ethiopians
sympathetic to the Eritrean cause. Ethiopian support of the proposal created a balanced symmetry between Ethiopian and Eritrean interests.
With mutual agreement, the armed conflict ended and the countries
were able to separate. Despite recurring conflicts, the legitimacy of the Eritrea was never seriously questioned. This followed closely events in Yugoslavia that were rapidly creating new nations in the wake of its federal
disintegration. Both events, occurring almost simultaneously, show that
normative change may be possible and that it can have positive impact on
the lives of the people living in those regions. Slovenia, for example, held a
referendum in December of 1990 in which over 90% voted in favor of
breaking away from Yugoslavia. 97 Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed the same process. All of these nascent countries predicated their secession from the Yugoslav Federation due to its inability to
"function as a legally organized state and that human rights, national rights,

94 The Secretary-General, Report of the Unied Nations Commissionfor Eritrea, 1

74, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/1285 (June 8, 1950);
KENNEDY NICHOLAS TREVASKIS, A COLONY IN TRANSITION:
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1941-52, at 17 (Ox-

ford Univ. Press, 1960).
95 See Katanga Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, African

Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. 75/92 (1995) (stating that Katanga has the right of self-determination within Zaira's territory but no right to break away, in light of the AU's
actions with regard to Biafra).
96 Haile, supra note 88, at 526-28.
97
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and the rights of republics and autonomous provinces are flagrantly violated
in

it."98

This claim, echoing the language of the 1960 and 1970 Declarations was similar, if more strident, to what was used by the Provisional
Government of Eritrea before the UN General Assembly, in which it was
stated that the past conflict had been "a just struggle waged against forcible
incorporation. . . ."99 In other words, Ethiopia's failure to respect the rights
of Eritreans, and its annexation of the region in 1962, justified their efforts
to break off from Ethiopia. This sentiment seems analogous to the creation
of the Yugoslav Republics, stemming as they did from the collapse of the
political core of Yugoslavia.
Critics of the international legal community bemoan its plodding
nature. Such a criticism is appropriate. Nevertheless, in creating the postYugoslav republics, recognizing the Baltic States, and recognizing the secession of Eritrea, the international community demonstrated that self-determination is capable of being applied more creatively than one would
believe. One just has to account for the centuries of inertia forcing it in one
direction. Events subsequent to the Ethiopian surrender demonstrate that the
international community can be flexible in its interpretation of self-determination and that judicial bodies in Europe can be receptive to novel solutions
in both inside and outside Europe.
BUILDING ANOTHER STABLE:

A CONcLusioN

De-colonization once defined Self-Determination and uti possidetis,
but those times have ended. The great imperial powers have faded; there
are no more colonial territories. Palau, the last Trust Territory, gained its
independence in 1994.100 The European's progeny, the salt-water colony,
has tried to mature amidst a crushing legacy of despotism, ethnic plurality,
and dualities of statehood such that these colonial states are houses made of
0 Without colonies, the scope and interpretation of self-determinacards.o'
tion needs to be altered to fit the new problems facing the post-colonial
state. Such changes need to be consistent, easy to conceptualize, and be as
applicable in Africa as they would be in Eurasia, South America, or anyFundamental Constitutional Character of Sovereignty and Independence of the
Republic of Slovenia, in 32 YUGOSLAV SURVEY QUARTERLY 47, 49 (1991) (quoting
Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. I of June 25, 199 1).
99 EYASSU, supra note 84, at 571.
98
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Proclamation No. 6726, 59 Fed. Reg. 49,777 (Sept. 27, 1994). Compact of Free

Association with Palau, Pub. L. 101-219, 103 Stat. 1870 (set up the legal framework that granted Palau independence as of October 1, 1994).
101 Mutua, supra note 55, at 1147.
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where else. In other words, this new understanding must not view Africa
paternalistically and as something inferior to the fledgling states in the
Balkans, or the often-repressive regimes in Central Asia.
As mentioned, Self-Determination is understood to involve the territorial separation from a colonial or foreign occupying power. This created
a territorial identity predicated on that separation. States today fear dismemberment at the hands of peoples within their state. Assuaging them of
their fear is unlikely to occur if the specter of the demise of their conception
of the state is continually advocated in academic circles.10 2 Instead, the
global community, including academics, should re-define self-determination to mean that peoples within a country have a right to be heard.
This must be a flexible notion, and for it to happen, minorities must
be understood as 'peoples' according to the human rights documents. Categorizing minorities as 'peoples' would grant them greater protection from
state depredations and would enable them to utilize the right of self-determination. Now, since the need for separation from a colonial power is no
longer necessary, this right should be interpreted as granting these groups a
voice at the national level. Vocalization of these newly minted peoples
would let them decide how best to protect their interest in the State. Such
protection could take the form of regional autonomy, greater representation
in the national legislature, or a host of other ideas. The ICCPR already
addresses this in Article 25:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity. . .and
without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections. . .held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general term of equality, to public
service in his[/her] country.103
102 CASSESE, supranote 14, at 350, n. 34 (noting authors who view self-determination as being equivalent to independence movements for full statehood: Yehuda Z.
Blum, Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination, 10 Isr. L. Rev.
509, 509-10 (1975); Yoram Dinstein, Self-Determination and the Middle EastConflict, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS,
243, 250-51 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980); Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander, Collective Human Rights of Peoples vis-a-vis Minorities,in MINORITIES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS, 71, 77-78 (Satish
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Proposals such as this stand a much better chance at success than
using independence as the default procedure. By guaranteeing that the
State will survive intact and that "minority peoples" are protected, both
sides win. Resource rich states do not have to worry about denuding their
wealth through balkanization and minority peoples can ensure that they receive their rightful share; this would have helped mitigate the repeated secessionist movements in Katanga and the bloodshed that ensued.' Under
this rubric, regional autonomy would most likely hdve satisfied the Katanganese demands for recognition and would not have aroused the fears of the
AU in a balkanization of African states and resource wars.105 Instead, these
fears led to the quick denunciation of Katanga and the slow demise of their
movement. 0 6
Brownlie, Castellino, and Cassese have thought along similar lines
and label this concept "internal self-determination."' 0 7 But this rubric is not
complete. Situations exist wherein regimes will not take the steps to recognize "minority peoples." Moreover, they may take actions that deprive such
groups of their human rights; situations like current conflict in the Darfur
region of Sudan, or the Balkan Wars in the late 1990s.108 In these situa10
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(2002) (discussing the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights ruling in
Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, namely that the Katangese people did not
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tions, the global community, beginning with the UN, must be willing to
relax the structures of uti possidetis and allow groups to secede from the
state.

Doing so would live up to the ideals of the principle of self-determination despite the radical approach. As Benyamin Neuberger states:
The right of secession is. . .a variant of the right of [selfdetermination]. [The people] defend [themselves] by seceding from an oppressive system. . . .There [are] compelling
reasons for secession such as if the physical survival or the
cultural autonomy of a nation is threatened, or if a population would feel economically excluded and permanently
deprived.109
A government that is unable or unwilling to respect the civil, political, and economic rights of its citizens would give rise to the affected peoples' right to secede as a form of self-determination. To hold otherwise
would not only fly in the face of the post-Cold War European experience, it
would continue to perpetuate the problems plaguing places such as Darfur.
The UN and the global community allowed secession movements
to succeed following the breakup of the USSR, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and even with the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia. These were
exceptional circumstances. But that is precisely why this aspect of a redefined international norm is necessary. Current problems relating to selfdetermination have sprung up because the forces involved were consistently
made to function within an internationally created legal bottleneck. By
forcing a myriad of complex political situations into the same round hole,
no one, not the leading members of the Western world, the State in question, or the peoples seeking to protect and preserve their rights, was served
by giving those seeking self-determination a square peg with which to try
and advocate their position. Secession, and subsequent international recognition, must be a last recourse if all other methods have failed."10
The global community will be able to establish a consistent postcolonial policy toward protecting the rights of minority peoples only when
it has broken the Hobson's choice that self-determination represents. Peoples currently have the choice to self-determine their political future out of
conflict between the Khartoum-based government of Sudan and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army); see, CRAWFORD, supra note 15.
109
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a colonial state but not to set up alternative national models to protect the
post-colonial population. This establishes an irreversible national and territorial identity at the cost of true representation for all of the territorial peoples. Such a right exists once and expires upon use. Those most in need of
protection and a voice are stripped of it in the need for separation from the
colonial power. Some would call this a necessary evil, where the needs of
many outweigh those trampled underfoot.
But it does not have to be this way. The "all or nothing" approach
represented by outdated interpretations of self-determination must be altered. A reinterpretation will take effort on the part of the UN and its Member States but it is possible. To do so would be to live up to the ideals of
the UN as reiterated in all its founding documents."' It would protect the
silent peoples in Africa and in other parts of the world struggling with the
legacy of colonialism. It would help to end a paternalistic view of Africa.
It would allay the fears of the AU in a balkanization of their authority.
Ending an inconsistent subservience to the letter, but not the spirit, of selfdetermination, like the Merchant for his pound of flesh, would enervate the
UN's promise to the world. If helping the helpless is part of the mission of
the UN, let us have it set the example and see if it can benefit those that
need it. We may find that such an action benefits us all. As Portia rebukes
Shylock at his trial:
The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.12
in1 U.N. Charter, supra note 3; the ICCPR, supra note 3; the ICESCR, supra note

3; Declaration on Minorities, supra note 19; 1970 Declaration, supra note 19; The
1960 Declaration, supra note 5; UDHR, supra note 19, at pmbl., arts. 21-22.
112 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1.

